Fiscal Architecture · Tax & Global Structuring Advisory

Intercompany Structuring & Transfer Pricing Governance.

How value moves between your entities is a structural decision, not an accounting one.

A foreign parent funding an Indian subsidiary — or routing services, IP, or financing through it — sets its intercompany pricing once, early, and usually for operational convenience rather than structural intent. Within two assessment cycles that same pricing is what the transfer-pricing officer reads back to decide how much of the group’s profit India is entitled to tax.

This is where the Fiscal Architecture of a cross-border group is actually built: not in the rate card, but in how functions, assets, and risks are placed across entities, and whether the pricing follows that placement defensibly.

The Framework

How We Frame Intercompany Pricing.

The firm does not treat transfer pricing as a year-end documentation exercise to be reconciled to a benchmark after the fact. It is the structural question of where a multinational group’s value is created and which entity is therefore entitled to the return — the arm’s-length principle under Sections 92 to 92F of the Income Tax Act made concrete in how the group is actually organised.

We frame the domain through where functions, assets, and risks sit (the FAR analysis), and, for intangibles, who performs the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection, and exploitation that the OECD DEMPE framework treats as the source of entitlement. The pricing is then designed to follow that allocation, not retrofitted to defend it.

A structure designed this way is defensible because the economics and the documentation say the same thing. A structure where pricing was set first and substance assumed later is where adjustment, penalty, and double taxation enter.

  • Value-chain placement Where the group’s functions, assets, and risks genuinely sit — the FAR analysis that decides which entity earns the residual return rather than a routine one.
  • Intangible entitlement Who performs the DEMPE functions for the group’s IP, since legal ownership alone no longer secures the return that ownership once implied.
  • Method & characterisation Whether each entity is characterised as a limited-risk provider, a full-risk principal, or something in between, and whether the chosen method follows from that rather than from convenience.
  • Substance & defensibility Whether the people, decisions, and capital that the pricing claims exist actually exist in the entity earning the return — the line between a defensible structure and a GAAR-exposed one.
The Analysis

The Intercompany Model, Examined Structurally.

Each element below is assessed for what it does to the group’s architecture — how profit is allocated, where audit risk concentrates, and how durable the position is — never as a compliance task to be closed out. The two decisions that determine the outcome in practice are set out here.

01

Transfer Pricing & Intercompany Design for Overseas Subsidiaries

The first structural decision is what the Indian entity is, functionally, within the group. A captive that develops software, a limited-risk distributor, a contract manufacturer, and a principal that owns the customer relationship each earn a different return under the arm’s-length principle — and that characterisation, not the headline margin, is what an officer tests first.

Where the parent funds the subsidiary, the same logic reaches the financing itself. Intercompany loans, guarantees, and the interest on them are transfer-pricing transactions in their own right; thin capitalisation under Section 94B caps the deductible interest on cross-border related-party debt at thirty per cent of EBITDA, so a structure financed for tax efficiency on day one can strand its own deductions.

Intangibles are where the design is most often wrong by default. A group that books IP ownership in one entity while the development and decision-making sit in another has separated legal ownership from DEMPE substance, and the return follows the substance. Designing the model means placing the functions and the entitlement in the same entity at the outset, not papering the gap afterward.

Capital issued to the Indian entity is priced under a separate regime — FEMA and Income Tax valuation norms at capital issuance govern the entry price independently of the operating arm’s-length analysis — and is owned at the cross-pillar link below; this page does not re-cover that framework. Likewise, how profit is ultimately extracted from a defensibly priced structure is addressed in full at the repatriation link below.

02

Documentation, Benchmarking & Compliance Framework

Documentation is not the deliverable; it is the evidence that the structure means what it says. India’s three-tier regime — the local file under the Section 92D rules, the master file under Section 92D read with Rule 10DA, and country-by-country reporting under Section 286 for groups above the consolidated-revenue threshold — exists so that the group’s global story and its India position are read together. A local benchmark that contradicts the master file is a finding waiting to be made.

The benchmarking itself is a governance discipline, not a search for the most favourable comparable. The method and the comparable set have to follow the characterisation already chosen in the design; a limited-risk entity benchmarked as if it bore full market risk invites exactly the adjustment the structure was meant to avoid.

Where the position is high-value or recurring, the framework extends forward into dispute prevention rather than waiting for scrutiny — advance pricing agreements and safe-harbour elections convert an annually contestable position into a pre-agreed one. That mechanism is designed at the dedicated page linked below; this framework establishes only why prevention belongs in the architecture from the start.

Structural Implications

What the Pricing Decision Sets in Motion.

How value is priced between entities is felt across the rest of the group’s architecture long after the first invoice. The most material downstream effects:

01

Profit Allocation

The FAR and DEMPE placement fixes how much of the group’s profit India is entitled to tax, and therefore the size of every future adjustment if the substance does not match.

02

Audit & Penalty Exposure

A primary adjustment cascades into interest and penalty, and an unresolved position can become economic double taxation until a competent-authority or APA route closes it.

03

Substance Scrutiny

A structure whose pricing outruns its real functions invites not only a transfer-pricing adjustment but anti-avoidance scrutiny under the framework linked below.